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Crawford: The Market Value Gas Royalty Clause Controversy Continued: Piney

THE MARKET VALUE GAS ROYALTY CLAUSE
CONTROVERSY CONTINUED: PINEY
WOODS COUNTRY LIFE SCHOOL v. SHELL
OIL CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past few years, the courts in several jurisdictions have
been called upon to interpret royalty clauses in gas leases.' The purpose
of these clauses in oil and gas leases is "to describe the benefits which are
intended to inure to the lessor as the result of the extraction of. . .valuable substances by the lessee." 2 These clauses determine the size of the
royalty a lessor, or mineral owner, will receive as payment from the
lessee, or producer, for the privilege of producing oil and gas.3 Furthermore, payment of the royalty provided for in the lease may consist of the
delivery of a share of oil or gas in kind4 or the payment of money.5 A gas
lease royalty clause providing for the payment of money may be in one of
two basic forms. In the first form, the royalty is stated as a fixed
amount.6 In the second, the royalty is calculated as a percentage of the
value of the gas or of the amount realized from the sale of gas.7
1. See, eg., Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977), reh'g denied, 440 U.S. 931
(1979); Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982); Tara Petroleum Corp. v.
Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
2. 3 E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 38.1, at 239 (1967).
3. Id. § 38.2, at 240. One author states that "economically the most important clause to the
lessor is the royalty clause; the lessor's hope at the time of the execution of the lease is for production

and the payment of royalty." 3 H. WILLIAMS,

OIL AND GA

LAW

§ 641, at 499 (1980).

4. 3 E. KuNTz, supra note 2, § 38.2, at 241. The right of the lessor to this type of royalty is
the right to delivery of the royalty oil or gas, i.e., the right to ownership of personal property.
Provisions for delivery of royalty gas in kind are not common, however. See id. § 40.3, at 297.
5. Id. § 38.2, at 240. The lessor's right with respect to this payment is a contractual right.
The lessor retains no property rights to the oil and gas. Id. at 241-42.
6. Id. § 40.2, at 292. Fixed royalty provisions were used in the early days when gas had little
or no value. These provisions were generally included in the lease only when the well produced only
gas. Such a provision was drafted as a covenant by the lessee to pay the lessor the fixed sum of
money or be liable for breach. Id. at 292-93. See, eg., Union Producing Co. v. Browne, 165 So. 2d
506 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Central States Prod. Corp. v. Jordan, 184 Okla. 262, 86 P.2d 790 (1939);
Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
7. See 3 E. KuNTz, supra note 2, § 38.2, at 241-42. The amount realized from the sale of gas
would be the gas sales contract price. For examples of royalty clauses, see 1 E. BROWN, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GA LEASES § 6.12 (rev. 2d ed. 1984); 3 H. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, § 641. One
common royalty clause uses both "market value" and "amount realized":
[O]n gas... produced from said land and sold or used off the premises. . .[the royalty
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The problems which developed with the royalty clauses in gas leases
are due to the nature of the gas and the evolution of the clauses., In the
early days of the industry, gas had little or no value.' As gas became
more valuable, its volatile nature made marketing difficult.10 Natural gas
could not be stored economically in tanks, as could oil.11 Instead, the gas
wells were hooked into pipelines." The expense of these pipelines, coupled with other production costs, caused the purchasers to require longterm gas contracts.13 The sellers were forced to accept these contracts
because they were obligated to the lessors to market the gas. 4 Thus,
many long-term gas sales contracts without price escalation clauses provided that sale prices were to remain constant for twenty years or more.I
When interstate sales of natural gas were regulated in 1954, maximum
6
prices were set and any existing escalation clauses were suspended.'
However, because gas in intrastate commerce was unregulated, its price
rose dramatically.'
shall be] the market value at the well ofone-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that
on gas sold at the wells, the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realizedfrom such
sale.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1981) (emphasis added).
8. See generally 3 E. KuNTZ, supra note 2, § 40.1; Fischl, Ascertaining the Value or Price of
Gasfor Purposesof the Royalty Clause, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 22 (1968); Hollimon, Exxon Corporation
v. Middleton: Some Answers But Additional Confusion in the Volatile Area of Market Value Gas
Royalty Litigation, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1981); Lowe, Developments in NonregulatoryOil and Gas
Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 117 (1981).
9. Fischl, supra note 8, at 23. Thus, no lease provisions were made for gas royalty payments.
Id.
10. See 3 E. KuNTZ, supra note 2, § 40.1, at 290; Hollimon, supra note 8, at 6.
11. Lowe, supra note 8, at 145.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also Hollimon, supra note 8, at 6 (discussion of the expenses and the necessity for
long-term contracts between producers and purchasers).
14. 1 E. BROWN, supra note 7, § 6.09, at 6-65; see also M. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO
COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 84 (2d ed. 1940); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW § 853 (rev. ed. 1984) (discussion of implied duty to market). The implied covenant to market gas is generally stated as the "duty to use due diligence to market the product." 5 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra, § 853, at 389. Furthermore, Williams and Meyers state that
"[s~ince return to the lessor [in the form of the royalty] is dependent upon the sale of the product
once it is discovered, the implied covenant to market can be viewed as another application of the
duty of cooperation that governs the relation of the parties to the lease contract." Id. at 390. The
duty to market arises under any lease in which royalty is payable in kind or is based on a fraction of
the gas produced. Id. This duty would then require the lessee to enter into the best available sales
contract at the time. M. MERRILL, supra, § 84, at 213. Remedies for breach of the duty are damages, or if inadequate, forfeiture of the lease. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra, § 854, at 398.
15. Lowe, supra note 8, at 145.
16. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982).
17. Lowe, supra note 8, at 146. Different categories of intrastate gas are now regulated by the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). See generally Green, The Natural
Gas Policy Act: Its Problemsand Prospects, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 425 (1983); Morgan & Patterson,
The Natural Gas PolicyAct of 1978: Four Years of Practiceand Two Years to Make Perfect, 71 KY.
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Royalty owners, observing that new sales contracts provided for

higher prices than the long-term gas sales contracts from which their
royalties were calculated, began searching for ways to obtain royalties

based on these higher rates."8 The royalty owners began initiating suits
to recover what they felt were underpayments of royalty."

They argued

that the term "market value" in the royalty clause should be interpreted
as the current market value.20 The lessees, in turn, contended that it was
the practice of the industry to equate market value with the amount realized on the sale.2"
The courts in the early cases decided in favor of the lessors by hold-

ing that market value or market price means current market value.22
However, later cases did not look to the literal meaning of the words but,
instead, looked to the intention of the parties and to the industry practices.2 3 These cases held that market value is the gas sales contract price,
or the amount realized from the sale of the gas.
The latest case dealing with the gas lease royalty clause controversy
is Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.24 In a well-reasoned
opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's decision in favor of the lessees, 25 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
decided that market value means the current market value when the gas
is produced and delivered. 26 The court based its decision on the "plain
meaning of the words" in the lease. Nevertheless, the court did interpret
other controversial language in favor of the lessees by looking to the parties' intentions and the customs of the industry. 7 However, the failure of

the court to apply the intention of the parties approach throughout its
L.J. 105 (1982); Silva and Rainey, Learning to Live With the NGPA-The Cents and Nonsense, 26
RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsr. 703 (1980).
18. Lowe, supra note 8, at 146.
19. Hollimon, supra note 8, at 7.
20. Id.
21. Lowe, supra note 8, at 146. Lowe states that "[m]any of the oil and gas lease royalty
clauses that were developed from the 1920s through the 1960s used references to market value or
market price at the well interchangeably with references to the amount realized at the well." Id.
(citation omitted). Furthermore, according to Lowe, if market value is computed "at the well," but
gas is sold off the premises, market value might be less than amount realized. This is because the
amount realized may include transportation or processing costs. Id. at 147; see infra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text.
22. See, eg., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
23. Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982); Henry v. Ballard & Cordell
Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982); Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
24. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
25. 539 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982), rev'd in part, affd in part,726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
26. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 231.
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decision perpetuates a view that is contrary to that of the industry, and
necessitates the use of preventive devices by the industry.2
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This class action resulted from the rising natural gas prices caused
by OPEC in the early 1970's.29 The lessors and Shell entered into the
Mississippi oil and gas leases in the mid-1960's.3 ° Shell used three different royalty clauses in seven different forms.3" The relevant portions of
the leases generally stated that the royalty for gas sold or used off the
premises was based on the market value at the well, while the royalty for
gas sold at the well was based on a percentage of the amount realized
from the sale.3 2 Because the gas from these wells was sour, Shell
processed or treated the gas before selling it.33 The gas was sold on the
intrastate market to two buyers,34 and both contracts provided for price
escalations.3 5 These contracts also provided that title to the gas passed in
the field before the gas was processed.3 6 However, the buyers' actual
28. See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
29. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 228. Shell had committed the gas for sale at pre-OPEC prices
under long-term contracts. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The three royalty provisions were termed by the district court as the "Commercial,"
the "Producers 88-D9803," and the "Producers 88 (9/70)." Id. The "Commercial" provision provided for royalty
on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance(s), produced from said land
and sold or used, the market value at the well of one-eighth (1/8)of the gas so sold or used,
provided that on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be one-eighth (V8) of the amount
realized from such sale(s) ....
The "Producers 88-D9803" provision provided for royalty
on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said land and
sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom,
the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas sold or used, provided that on gas sold
at the wells royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale ....
The "Producers 88 (9/70)" ordered the lessee
to pay lessor on gas and casinghead gas produced from said land (1) sold by lessee, oneeighth of the amount realized by lessee, computed at the mouth of the well or (2) when
used by lessee offsaid land or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market
value at the mouth of the well, of one-eighth of such gas and casinghead gas ....
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 229. Shell treated the sour gas at its plant, and recovered "sweet gas" (dry methane)
and elemental sulphur. Id.
34. Id. These buyers were MisCoa, a partnership of two Mississippi corporations, and Mississippi Power and Light (MP & L). Id.
35. Id. The contract between Shell and MisCoa provided for a sale price of 531 per mcf (thousand cubic feet) with an increase to 54.59(; after 15 million mcf were delivered and then with a price
escalation of three percent per year. Shell's contract with MP & L to sell excess gas was for 45¢ per
mcf, with escalation of one percent per year. Id.
36. Id.
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control of the gas did not occur until it was processed.3 7 Shell paid royalties based on actual revenues from sales of sweet gas and sulfur, and
not based on the market value.38 Then, a substantial part of the processing costs were deducted from the royalties.39
The lessors brought suit in 19744' alleging that the royalty payments

were improperly calculated.4 ' In 1982, the district court found that Shell
did not err in deducting the processing costs from the royalty payments
or in basing the royalties for gas sold on the actual amount realized because title passed at the wells.4 2 However, the court found that gas consumed in off-lease operations should have incurred royalties computed by
current market value.4 3
The case was certified for appeal.' On appeal, the court stated that
the issues to be considered were "the meaning of 'market value' and 'sold
at the wells' in a royalty clause and the propriety of deducting processing
costs from the lessors' royalties. '4 The court also considered where the
point of sale occurred for the contracts.'

III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A.

General Background of the Market Value Controversy
As mentioned earlier, a study of the background of the market value

37. Id. The MisCoa contract used measurements of quality and quantity to determine the
price. These measurements were not made until the gas was "redelivered" as sweet gas off the field.

The MP & L contract provided for "redelivery" near Shell's plant. Furthermore, it appears that the
parties agreed that title would pass at the wells in order to avoid state regulations on pipelines. Id.
38. Id.

39. Id. Generally, royalty is to be paid to the lessor free from the costs of production, but
lessees are allowed to deduct expenses subsequent to production when the royalty is payable "at the
well." That is, the royalty is "subject to a proportionate share of the costs incurred subsequent to
production." 3 H. WILLIAMs, supra note 3, § 645, at 594. The courts have allowed deductions for
production and severance taxes, transportation expenses, and treatment, compression, and manufacturing expenses required to make the product salable or more valuable. Id. at § 645.2. But see M.
MERRILL, supra note 14, § 85, where he states that
[i]f it is the lessee's obligation to market the product, it seems necessarily to follow
that his is the task also to prepare it for market, if it is unmerchantable in its natural form.
..
[Il]t
is erroneous to read into the royalty clauses stipulations concerning the costs of
marketing and preparation which are not specifically expressed.
Id. § 85, at 214-16.
40. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
41. Id. at 960.
42. Id. at 973, 977.
43. Id. at 977. The court, however, rejected the evidence presented by the lessors on computing
market value and requested further evidence. Id. at 986. The court also rejected, without explanation, the lessors' claims for royalties on the gas consumed by Shell at its plant. Id.
44. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 230.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 231-33.
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controversy begins with a look at the nature of gas and the development
of the gas royalty clause.4 7 As long as the current market value equalled
the gas sales contract prices, there were no disputes caused by the language in the royalty clause. However, once interstate gas became regu-

lated and intrastate prices rapidly increased, a8 lessors felt that their
royalties were being underpaid.4 9
Early clauses used "market value" or "market price" interchange-

ably with "amount realized" when the gas was sold at the well. 50 The
draftsmen of the early leases apparently intended "market value at the
well" to equal the contract price when the gas was sold at the well and to
be less than the contract price when sold or consumed off the well. If the

gas was sold off the well, transportation and processing costs could then
be deducted in order to arrive at a value similar to that of gas sold at the
well.51 Thus, "at the well" refers not only to the location of the gas when
sold but also to the state of the gas.
The courts have followed two views in interpreting market value or

market price in gas royalty provisions.52 The first view is that market
value is actually the current market value.53 This view looks to the plain

meaning of the words in the lease. 54 In contrast, the second view holds
that "market value at the well" is the gas sales contract price if the con-

tract was entered into at arm's length and in good faith.55 This view
considers the intention of the parties and the realities of the oil and gas
industry. 6
47. See supra text accompanying notes 8-17.
48. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. For example, in one case a long-term contract
called for sale prices of 32r per mcf for the first year and 33c per mcf the second year. Royalties
were based on these amounts. Shortly after the contract was executed, the Federal Power Commission raised the ceiling price for this regulated gas as high as $1.30 per mcf. See Tara Petroleum
Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Okla. 1981).
50. Lowe, supra note 8, at 146; see supra note 21. Also, most courts make no real distinction
between market value and market price. See, e.g., Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924
(5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656 (1935).
51. See Harmon, Gas Royalt--Vela, Middleton, and Weatherford, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N 65, 69 (1982). See supra note 39 for a discussion of deductible expenses.
52. See 1 E. BROWN, supra note 7, § 6.09, for an excellent discussion of the cases in the different jurisdictions.
53. See, ag., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968) (market value is
not the contract price but is the market price at time of delivery instead).
54. Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 870. This view also defines "at the well" to be on the actual lease in
question. See, eg., Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Tex. 1981). See infra text
accompanying note 101.
55. Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Okla. 1981).
56. Id. at 1273-74.
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B. Early Case Law
The first major case dealing with the market value issue was Foster
v. Atlantic Refining Co.57 In Foster, the lessors brought suit to recover
royalties computed under a twenty-year gas sales contract.58 However,
the royalty clause differed from those usually found in leases. It stated
that the royalties were to be calculated as one-eighth of the oil and gas,
"the same to be delivered to the credit of the Lessor. . .and to be sold
at the market price therefor prevailing for the field where produced when
run." 59 The lessee paid royalties based on the 1950 sales contract, but by
1957, the market price was higher than that provided for in the contract.6" The lessors claimed entitlement to royalties based on this higher
amount.6 1
In holding for the lessors, and affirming this portion of the trial
court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined
that the "market price" referred to in the lease was not the gas sales
contract price.62 The court refused to consider the defense that this
higher royalty would be burdensome to the lessee, stating that the lessee
entered into the sales contract with full knowledge and took the risk of
that contract producing royalties satisfactory to the lease terms. 63 Considering the peculiar royalty clause language in the lease, it is not difficult
to see why the court reached this result.' The words "when run" imply
that a specific time was intended. 65 As a result of this limiting language,
57. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
58. Id. at 487-88. In 1950, the lessees entered into a gas sales contract which provided for price
escalation for three successive five-year periods. For the fourth five-year period, the price was to be
"the fair and reasonable value" of gas of similar quality and quantity, provided that it would not be
less than 10.0883 cents per mcf. Id. at 488.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. In 1957 the price prevailing in the field was 13 cents and from 1958-1962 was 14 cents.

Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 489-90.
63. Id. at 489. The court stated:
The inability of Atlantic to make a gas sales contract with escalation provisions is
beside the point. The obligation of Atlantic to pay royalties is fixed and unambiguous. It
made the gas sales contract with full knowledge of this obligation and did nothing to protect itself against increases in price. The fact that its purchaser would not agree to pay the
market price prevailing at the time of delivery does not destroy the lease obligation.
Id.
64. See Morris, The Gas Royalty Clause-Whatis Market Value?, 25 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. &
TAX'N 63, 68 (1974).
65. Id. Furthermore, it seems that "when run" was inappropriate language to use in referring
to natural gas. According to Morris, since the royalty clause did not suggest that the phrase was to
refer to other substances, the use of the current price was the correct interpretation. Id. at 68-69.
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the Fosterdecision had only a slight impact on the oil and gas industry. 6
The next major case was JM.Huber Corp. v. Denman,6 7 which also
involved a peculiar fact situation. The lessor in Denman required the
lessee to obtain a gas purchase contract prior to the making of the lease.6"
The purchase contract called for a price of 3.5o per mcf for ten years,

and 4o per mcf thereafter.6 9 However, the lease called for a royalty calculation of 4o per mcf for the first ten years, and market price
thereafter.70
In holding that the market price was not the contract price, the
court noted that, although the contract and the lease stated different

prices, 7 the lessee had paid royalties based upon the 4o per mcf price of
the lease rather than upon the contract price.72 The court observed that

"the construction put on the contract by responsible action of the parties
is frequently the best revelation of its purpose . . . .

Finally, the

court stated that it would not focus on the particular transaction but
instead would look at a "theoretical one" between a free seller and a free
buyer dealing at arm's length.74
C. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela
Two years after Denman was decided, the Texas Supreme Court decided what has become the leading case in this controversy. Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela75 involved a lease which was executed in 1933.76 It
66. Lowe, supra note 8, at 147-48.
67. 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
68. 367 F.2d at 108. Accordingly, the lessee entered into a contract with an interstate pipeline
company before the lessor executed the lease. Id.
69. Id. at 108-09. The contract was renegotiated in 1961 at 11 cents per mcf. Id.
70. Id. at 107. The lease provided that the payments would never be calculated at less than 4
cents per mcf. Id.
71. Id. at 108-09.
72. Id. at 109. Thus, an inference arose that the contract price was not intended by the parties
to be the market value. Id.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id. The industry anticipated, nevertheless, that the Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.),
which controlled the regulated interstate ceilings, would limit problems through the use of a ceiling
price. The ceiling rate would then be both amount realized and market price. On remand, the
F.P.C. asserted jurisdiction over royalty owners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the F.P.C. because royalty owners do not "sell" gas in interstate commerce. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 256, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972), reh'gdenied, 409 U.S. 902 (1973). The intricacies of interstate gas
regulation are beyond the scope of this paper. The reader's attention is directed to 1 E. BROWN,
supra note 7, at § 6.09(2), for a more extensive discussion of the controversy as applied to federal
regulations.
75. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
76. Id. at 868.
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provided that the royalty was to be calculated for gas sold or used off the
premises as "one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so
sold or used."7 7 The long-term gas sales contracts entered into in 1935
and 1937 provided a price of 2.3o per mcf.7s The lessors brought suit to
recover 79 alleged deficiencies in payments for the years 1960 through
1964.80 During those years, other gas sales contracts from the same field
provided much higher prices.
The Texas Supreme Court found for the lessors and stated that the
royalties are to be determined from the provisions of the lease and not
from the contract.8 2 The court, following Foster, decided that the sales
contract price was not the lease's market price."3 The court based this
decision upon the fact that part of the royalty clause stated that royalties
for certain gas sold at the well were to be based on the proceeds of its
sale.8 4 The court stated:

It is clear then that the parties knew how to and did provide for
royalties payable in kind, based upon market price or market value,
and based upon the proceeds derived by the lessee from the sale of gas.
They might have agreed that the royalty on gas produced from a gas
well would be a fractional part of the amount realized by the lessee
from its sale. Instead of doing so, however, they stipulated in plain
terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of
85 the market price at the
well of all gas sold or used off the premises.
Accordingly, the court rejected the lessees' argument that the gas was
"sold" at the time the long-term gas sales contracts were executed. The
court found, instead, that the gas was "sold" when delivered to the
purchaser.8 6
The court also rejected the argument, similar to that made by the
lessee in Foster,that this interpretation of "market value" is burdensome
77. Id.
78. Id. at 870. These contracts were for the "life of the lease." Id. at 868.
79. The lessors sued for additional relief on the theory that the premises were being drained and
not developed properly. Id. at 870. That issue was severed and remanded to the district court for a
determination of damages after the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found for the lessors. Id. at 869.
80. Id. at 868.
81. Id. The trial court found that during this four-year period the market price was 13.047
cents per mcf. Id. at 869.
82. Id. at 870. The court stated that the lease "was executed prior to and is wholly independent
of the gas sales contracts." Id.

83. Id. at 871.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court cited as support Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431, 433 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, judgmt adopted).
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to the lessee.8 7 The court stated that "the market price of gas is to be
determined by sales of gas comparable in time, quality and availability to

marketing outlets.""8

The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that market price
is determined at the time of delivery. 9 The dissent distinguished Foster
because of its peculiar royalty clause language.9" The dissent stated that
courts should look to the customs of the industry in order to determine
at what time the market price is to be determined. 91
Several commentators generally agree with the dissent in Vela.92
One commentator argues that Fostershould not be controlling in the absence of language in the clause to the effect that market price is to be
determined in the future. 93 These critics also state that Vela should not
be followed by jurisdictions which have not yet decided the issue.94 They
urge that the facts and circumstances known to both lessor and lessee
95
should be examined instead.
Despite these criticisms, in 1981 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
87. 429 S.W.2d at 871; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88. 429 S.W.2d at 872. The court agreed with the court of civil appeals that "the mathematical
average of all prices paid in the field is not a final answer to the difficult problem of determining
market price at any particular time." Id. at 873. The court also found that objections to the basis of
an expert's testimony go only to weight and not to admissibility. Id. at 872.
89. Id. at 878. Four justices dissented.
90. Id. at 880 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Justice Hamilton stated that "[the problem before us
is by no means the problem that the 5th Circuit had in the Foster case." Id.
91. Id. at 879. Justice Hamilton wrote:
[W]e must look to common practices in the industry at the time the lease contract was
made in 1933 to ascertain what was the intention of the partieswith reference to this matter
[determining when "market price" is to be computed]. All parties agree and this Court so
holds that at such time the only sales for gas from wells producing gas only were made on
long-term contracts or for the life of the lease. The parties, when they entered into the
lease contract, knew how such gas had to be marketed; it had to be marketed under a
contract similar to the one before us. Consequently, when the parties entered into the lease
contract they all knew that the term "market price" necessarily meant the price prevailing
for gas on long-term contract as of the time the sale contract should be made.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. Accord 3A W. Summers, Oil & Gas Leases § 589 (Supp. 1984); see Fisehl, supra note 8, at
31; Hoffman, Oil and Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssues andAnswers, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N 211, 211 (1980); Morris, supra note 64, at 75.
93. Morris, supra note 64, at 75.
94. 3A W. SUMMERS, supra note 92, § 589, at 13; Morris, supra note 64, at 75.
95. Morris, supranote 64, at 83. The result in Vela surprised the industry. See, e.g., Hollimon,
supra note 8, at 9 n.24. The industry representatives considered the terms of the royalty clause in
Foster to be so unusual that they believed the phrase "when run" played a central role in the Foster
court's decision and considered the Foster decision as being effectively limited to its facts. Consequently, Vela surprised many persons in the industry despite the clear implication of the language in
Foster. Id. See also Lowe, supra note 8, at 149-50. The lease draftsmen abandoned the use of
royalty clauses containing references to "market value" or "market price". Others tried to protect
themselves by drafting division orders from the lessor to the lessee with language purporting to
amend the underlying leases to change market value royalty provisions to proceeds provisions. Id.
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and expanded the Vela rule in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton.96 Exxon secured leases with royalty clauses providing that royalties for gas "produced from said land and sold or used off the premises" were to be
calculated by "the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so
sold or used . . . ."9 For gas "sold at the wells," royalties would be
"one-eighth of the amount realized from [the] sale."9 8 The lessors sought

to recover alleged deficiencies in royalties for the years 1973 through
1975. 99 The court in Middleton followed Vela in holding that market
value and amount realized do not have the same meaning." °° However,
the court expanded upon Vela's holding by construing "sold at the wells"
to mean sold at the wells within the lease, and not sold at the wells within
the fields. 10 1 Therefore, a market value rate was applied to all gas sold
off the lease."°2 The court also determined that gas is "sold" when it is
delivered, since "produced" refers to its being extracted. 10 3 The court
also further developed the Vela holding as to how market value is to be

calculated." °
96. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
97. Id. at 241. Sun Oil Company was also a defendant. Its royalty clause was substantially the
same. Id. at 242.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 241.
100. Id. at 245. The court found that the parties did not use "market value" and "amount
realized" interchangeably and rejected Exxon's assertion that essentially the same meaning was intended for both. Id.
101. Id. at 243-44. In doing so, the court disapproved a lower court's holding in Butler v. Exxon
Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (rex. Civ. App. 1977), that the Texas Supreme Court had refused to examine. In Butler, the trial court found that "sold at the wells" included sales, i.e., deliveries, anywhere in the vicinity of the field. Id. at 414. Thus, the Butler sales, occurring off the premises, were
determined to be "at the wells" as understood in the industry, and royalty was then based upon
amount realized. The Middleton decision limited "sold at the wells" to the lease and not the field.
102. 613 S.W.2d at 243. The court concluded that "off the premises" modified both "used" and
"sold" as opposed to Exxon's argument that "off the premises" modified only the word "used" and
thus royalty for all gas sold should be calculated by the amount realized clause as a proviso to the
market value section. Id. See Harmon, supra note 51, at 82-83, and Lowe, supra note 8, at 154, for
discussions of this interpretation.
103. 613 S.W.2d at 244. The court rejected Exxon's arguments that the "practicalities of the
natural gas industry require [the courts] to construe 'sold' to mean the time the gas becomes committed to a bona fide long-term gas contract ...
" and stated that "[a]lthough as between Exxon and
its customers, the gas may have been sold when the contracts became effective, there is no basis in
the royalty clause for applying such a definition to the lease agreements." Id. at 245 (footnotes
omitted). The court cited Foster in deeming it unfortunate that subsequent increases in market value
would impose a financial burden upon the lessee. Id.
104. Id. at 245-49. Factors the court mentioned in defining comparable sales were time, quality,
quantity, and availability of marketing outlets. Id. at 246 (citing Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 872; see supra
note 88 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the court in Middleton found that
[s]ales comparable in time occur under contracts executed contemporaneously with
the sale of the gas in question. Sales comparable in quality are those of similar physical
properties such as sweet, sour, or casinghead gas. Quality also involves the legal characteristics of the gas; that is, whether it is sold in a regulated or unregulated market, or in one
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Comparable to the Vela decision, the Middleton case has been criti-

cized as causing inconsistencies or ridiculous results in the industry. 0 5
Contrary to the court's holding, use of the term "at the well" in royalty

clauses was intended by those in the industry to allow the deduction of
processing costs and other costs subsequent to production. 106

It appears that the Vela theory has been followed in at least two
other jurisdictions. The Kansas Supreme Court, in Lightcap v. Mobil Oil

Corp.,1"7 followed the Vela approach in a context different from that in
Vela and Middleton. In Lightcap, the gas contracts covered the regulated
interstate market and, therefore, were bound by Federal Power Commis-

sion (FPC) regulations.1"8 In construing the lease against the lessee and

in favor of the lessor,"°t the court found that the clause calling for royal-

ties based on market value meant current market value or price and did
particular category of a regulated market. Sales comparable in quantity are those of similar volumes to the gas in question. To be comparable, the sales must be made from an area
with marketing outlets similar to the gas in question.
613 S.W.2d at 246-47 (footnotes omitted); see also Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367
F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1966) (standard test for determining the market value of gas sold on interstate
market is what a willing seller and a willing buyer agree to take and pay, subject to industry regulations and FPC [now FERC] approval); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.
1946) (market value of gas is to be determined by sales of gas comparable in time, quality and
availability of marketing outlets), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 714 (1946). For additional discussions of
these determinations, see Hollimon, supra note 8, at 71-76; Note, The Market Value Controversy:
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 16 TULSA L.J. 550 (1981).
105. Professor Lowe aptly described this inconsistency:
[Tihe court's decision to make the royalty measurement dependent upon the delivery point
of the gas may well lead to ludicrous results. Suppose, for example, thatA Company leases
from 0 under four separate but identical leases contiining the Middleton royalty formulation or similar language, in the northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest quarter sections of a township. Suppose further that wells are drilled on each of the four quarter
sections and that the gas from the wells is committed to sale under a single gas contract.
Suppose finally that the gas pipeline at which deliveries are made runs East-West across the
northeast and northwest quarter sections so that the meters for the wells on the leases of
the northwest and southwest quarter sections are set on the northwest quarter section
while the meters for the wells on the northeast and southeast quarter sections are set on the
northeast quarter section. If the gas contract provides, as is typical, that the ownership of
the gas passes at the meter, then under the Middleton decision, royalties on gas from the
wells on the northeast and northwest quarter sections would be calculated on the basis of
the amount realized by the lessee under the terms of the gas contract because sales would
take place on the leased premises. But royalties on gas from the wells drilled on the southeast and southwest quarter sections would be calculated on the basis of current market
value when delivered because the sales would take place "off the premises."
Lowe, supra note 8, at 155-56.
106. See supra notes 39, 51 and accompanying text. Lowe, supra note 8, at 156, states that
apparently these decisions are "nothing but an application of the time honored rule of construction
that a contract is to be construed against the drafting party, since he is in the best position when the
contract is drafted to avoid any problems." Id. But see 2 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS LEASES § 372
(2d ed. 1958) (criticizing this rule of construction).
107. 221 Kan. 488, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
108. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 4.
109. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 9.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/5

12

Crawford: The Market Value Gas Royalty Clause Controversy Continued: Piney

1985]

MARKET VALUE

not mean the amount realized. 1 ° The court stated that the federal regulations over the rates the lessee can receive as sales contract prices do not
prevent a higher rate from being fixed as market value in a lease royalty
clause.1 11 Thus the "market value" was neither the contract price nor
the FPC-approved price.
The Lightcap decision was followed by the Montana Supreme Court
in MontanaPower Co. v. Kravik 1 12 The trial court used FPC regulations
to determine market value for gas that was sold in the intrastate market.1 13 The supreme court found, instead, that market value is the curgas at the well where it is produced,
rent market price being paid for
1 14
regardless of FPC regulations.
D.

Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey

The Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted a position similar to the dissent in Vela. In Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 115 the court construed
the lease royalty clause containing the phrase "market price at the well"
for gas sold or used off the premises to refer to the gas sales contract
price. 1 6 The court felt that it would be unfair to producers to require
them to pay as royalty up to one-half of what they received. 117 The court
felt that this was unfair because the lessee is forced into a contract by his
duty to the lessor.11
The court limited its ruling, however, by requiring that the gas sales
110. Id. at-, 562 P.2d at 10.
111. Id. at-, 562 P.2d at 8. The court stated that payment should be based on a theoretical free
market. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 11. Apparently, though, the court did not set more guidelines than
this. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 30-31 (Fromme, J., dissenting).
112. 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978).
113. Id. at 300.
114. Id. at 302. Thus, the court held the regulations irrelevant. Id.
115. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981). The lease was executed in 1973 by Tara Petroleum. Through
a series of assignments, the lease was assigned eventually to Wilcoy Petroleum. In 1976, Wilcoy
entered into a gas purchase contract. The contract was for two years and was terminated at the end
of the period. The royalties were based on the contract price. Id. at 1271.

116. Id. at 1272.
117. Id. As an example, the court considered the situation in Tara itself:
Under their contract the producers received 32c per mcf the first year. The royalty share
of that amount, one eighth, is 4r. Yet by the end of the first year the first purchaser,
Jarrett, was receiving nearly $1.28 for the gas. One eighth of $1.28 is 164. So if royalty
were measured by the price El Paso Natural Gas paid Jarrett, the lessors' royalty would
have quadrupled in one year-to one half of the producers' revenues.
Id. at 1273.
118. Id. at 1273; see supranote 14 and accompanying text. The court also discussed the contemplation of the parties when they negotiate the oil and gas leases, and the knowledge the parties have
of the industry. 630 P.2d at 1273.
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contract be entered into at arm's length and in good faith."t 9 If so, the
lease's market price will be the contract price.1 2 The burden is on the
lessor-plaintiff, however, to prove that the contract was unfair or illusory.1 2 1 Since there was no indication of this in Tara, the court found for
12 3
the lessees. 122 To date, the Tara view has been followed in Arkansas
and Louisiana, 2 4 and is held as the better view by several commentators. 125 One commentator stated:
The decision in Tara is ultimately more fair than that of other
jurisdictions. It is more closely in line with the contemplated results of
both parties when they entered the lease. As the court remarked,
surely the lessor never expected that his royalty could be half of what
the producer received for the gas. That this rule is advantageous and
fair to the lessee is obvious. But at the same time it does not create an
undue hardship on the lessor, because he1 2receives
the benefit of the
6
agreement which he made with the lessee.
IV.

THE DECISION IN PINEY WOODS COUNTRY LIFE SCHOOL V.
SHELL OIL CO.

In response to the lessors' argument that they deserved higher royalty payments, the court in Piney Woods examined several specific
phrases in the oil and gas leases. One such phrase was "sold at the
wells."' 127 The court determined that this phrase implies a distinction
between gas in its natural state and gas to which value has been added by
transportation or by processing, and is not just a term referring to when
119. Id. The court stated that
if the contract was not reasonable when entered into, if it is not at a minimum fair and

representative of other contracts negotiated at the time in the field, then a different result
[than contact price equaling "market value") obtains. Then the lessee has not protected his
lessor in discharging his duty to market the gas, and there is no policy in the law requiring
the courts to protect the lessee in interpreting the lease.
Id. at 1274.
120. Id. at 1273.
121. Id. at 1274.
122. Id. at 1276. There was some argument that Tara and the purchaser were commonly controlled, but the court held that not enough proof was shown and the plaintiffs did not meet their
burden of proof. Id. at 1275.
123. Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982); see also Note, Hillard v. Stephens: InterpretationofPrice Royalty Provisionsin Natural GasLeases, 36 ARK. L. REV. 312 (1982).
124. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
125. See 3A W. SUMMERS, supranote 92, § 589; Note, Oil and Gas: Market Price Under a LongTerm Gas Contract: Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 35 OKLA.L. REV. 427 (1982); Note, Market
Value and Long-Term Purchase Contracts: Tara Petroleum Corporation v. Hughey, 17 TULSA L.J.
566 (1982).
126. Note, Market Value and Long-Term Purchase Contracts:Tara Petroleum Corporation v.
Hughey, 17 TULSA L.J. 566, 583 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
127. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).
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the gas is sold. 1 28
The court considered whether Shell actually sold the gas "at the
well."' 129 Although the sales contracts provided that title passed in the
field,13 the actual sale prices were determined off the field after processing and transportation. 13 1 The court stated that "the simple passage of
title does not control whether the gas was 'sold at the well' within the
meaning of the leases."' 1 32 The court reasoned that to decide otherwise
would place the lessors at the mercy of the lessee since the lessors had no
say as to where title would pass. 133 Therefore, for two of the lease roysince processalty clause provisions, the gas was not "sold at the wells"
34
ing and transportation added to the value of the gas.1
The court also focused on the meaning of the phrase "market
value." Because the gas was not sold "at the wells," two lease provisions
required that the royalties be calculated according to market value.135 In
affirming the district court's holding that a gas sales contract is executory

and executed only upon production and delivery, 13 6 the court looked to
the Uniform Commercial Code as applied in Mississippi. 137 Because the
128. Id. at 231. The "Commercial" and the "Producers 88-D9803" royalty clauses provided
that royalty on gas "sold at the wells" was to be based on amount realized from the sale, while the
royalty for other gas was to be based on "market value at the well." The "Producers 88 (9/70)"
clause based the royalty for all gas sold on amount realized computed at the well. Royalty for gas
used by the lessee was based on market value at the well. Id. at 229; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
To reach this determination, the court considered the purpose of the gas royalty clause. Id. at
230. The court quoted Harmon [supra note 51] but rejected his theory that market value would not
exceed actual proceeds. 726 F.2d at 231; see infra note 143 and accompanying text.
129. 726 F.2d at 231.
130. Id. at 229.
131. Id. at 231; see supra note 37 and accompanying text. For example, the payment for the
MisCoa contract was based on the amount of processed gas delivered. 726 F.2d at 231.
132. 726 F.2d at 232. The court rejected the district court's finding that the gas was sold in the
fields due to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 231-32.
133. Id. at 232. Also, "strange results" may occur if "sold at the wells" is based solely on where
title passed.
For example, if gas from several leases is delivered at a single point in the fields some
lessors may be entitled to market value royalty while others receive proceeds royalty; similarly, gas produced from one lease through a directional well drilled on another lease
would be sold "off the lease" even if delivered at the wellhead itself.
Id. (citing Hollimon, supra note 8, at 47-49, 48 nn.185-86).
134. 726 F.2d at 233.
135. Id. at 230; see supra note 128. The district court held that Shell owed market value royalty
under all the leases for gas used in off-lease operations. 539 F. Supp. 957, 977 (S.D. Miss. 1982); see
supra note 43 and accompanying text. This holding was not appealed. 726 F.2d at 233. The district
court defined "market value" as value when the gas is delivered rather than when the gas sales
contract is made. 539 F. Supp. at 981.
136. 539 F. Supp. at 981.
137. 726 F.2d at 234 nn.9-10, (examining MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-105 (gas is future goods)
and 75-2-107(1) (sales contracts are only effective when gas is severed from land) (1981)).
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leases could terminate under certain conditions, Shell had only a defeasible interest in the gas. If the leases terminated, then title would revert to
138
have no claim to the gas itself.1 39

the lessors

and the purchasers would

Thus the gas was not sold until produced and delivered. The purchasers

did not have control of the gas until that time."4
In determining the meaning of "market value," the court examined
both the Vela and the Tara views.14 1 The court adopted the Vela view in

respect to when gas is sold, 42 and expressly refuted the theory of commentators that market value cannot exceed actual proceeds or amount
realized.1 43 This theory is that "market value" is simply actual proceeds
or actual proceeds less processing expenses. 1" The court criticized this
interpretation because gas that is consumed off the premises has no ac-

tual proceeds. The court reasoned that the royalties for both gas consumed and the gas sold should be computed using the same formula.1 45

Furthermore, the court stated that Shell should have known of the mean1 46
ing given to "market value" by earlier cases such as Foster and Vela.

The court reasoned that Shell could have used "proceeds" clauses if such
were desired.14 7

Shell claimed that basing royalty payments upon good faith contract
prices was an accepted custom within the oil and gas industry. The court
rejected this claim by pointing out, "[flor a practice to be legally relevant
custom, both parties to the contract must have actual or presumed
knowledge of the practice."1 48 As the lessors "cannot be presumed to
' of such a practice, custom would not be binding.15 0 The court
know"149

rejected the argument that it would be unfair to determine that market

value is the current market value. Tara's view, allowing such an inter138. 726 F.2d at 234. For example, Shell may breach implied or express covenants or there may
be a cessation of production. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 235. The court backed its conclusion on the explicit distinctions in the lease between
gas sold at the well and that sold off the lease, and between amount realized and market value. Id.
141. Id. at 233.
142. Id. at 233-35; see supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
143. 726 F.2d 235 (disagreeing with Harmon, supra note 51, at 69, and Lowe, supra note 8, at
146).
144. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
145. 726 F.2d at 235.
146. See supra notes 62, 83 and accompanying text.
147. 726 F.2d at 236.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. In Shell Oil Co. v. Williams, Inc., 428 So. 2d 798 (La. 1983), Shell stipulated that the
market value was the current market value. The appellate court used this case to show that the
current market value view was not unheard of. See 726 F.2d at 236.
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pretation when the contract was entered into at arm's length and in good
faith, was rejected as well. The court stated that while" [w]e appreciate
that a lessee may find itself economically disadvantaged when its royalty
obligations increase while its sale revenues remain constant, . . . this
[disadvantage] is no more than the risk assumed by every business venturer who undertakes the role of middleman."15' 1 Furthermore, "[i]t is
not the function of the courts, construing and enforcing contracts under
state law, to intervene on behalf of producers experienced in the petrothereby deprive lessors of their legitimate contractual
leum industry, and
15 2
expectations."
The court concluded that Tara's view was unfair to the lessors who
might interpret market value language as meaning current market value.
These lessors might decide to take the risk that the current market value
would rise and therefore pick a lower "market value" percentage royalty
clause over a higher "amount realized" one. 53
The court refused to reconsider the district court's method of proving market value, holding that the district court was within its discretion
to seek evidence of comparable sales. 5a Finally, the court allowed Shell
to deduct processing and transportation costs for gas sold in order to
compute market value "at the well." '5 5 Because production ends when
the gas is extracted, expenses subsequent to production may be charged
to royalty when royalty is computed "at the well." '56 The case was remanded to determine market value and the existence of reasonable ex1 57
penses subsequent to production.
151. 726 F.2d at 237.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court stated that it would be unfair to the lessors if "market value" equalled
"amount realized." "By enforcing the clear terms of the market value lease, we preserve those
expectations and provide opportunities and incentives for the parties to make new contracts more
nearly reflecting current economic conditions." Id. at 238.
154. Id. at 238. "Market value is a question of fact, and it is up to the factfinder to determine the
probative strength of relevant evidence." Id. "The only general rule that emerges from [the various]
cases is that the method of proof varies with the facts of each particular case." Id. For one example,
see Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 187 Mont. 87, 586 P.2d 298 (1978) (two methods are lease
comparison and receipts less costs and expenses).
155. 726 F.2d at 240. Also, under the "88 (9/70)" clause, amount realized for all gas sold was to
be computed at the "mouth of the well." Id. at 240-41; see supra note 128. The court rejected
authority that production includes marketing efforts. See supra note 39.
156. 726 F.2d at 240 (citing 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 645 (1981)). These process-

ing costs must be reasonable. Id. at 241.
157. Id. at 238-39, 241. The court also held that royalty must be paid for plant fuel, i.e., gas
Shell uses from lessors' leases for operations at Shell's plant. The lower court had allowed the claim
for royalty for gas used by Shell on other leases but had denied the lessors' claim for royalty on plant
fuel. Id. at 241; see supranote 43. The appellate court held that if the costs are reasonable, royalties
paid on plant fuel can be charged back to lessors as a processing cost. 726 F.2d at 241. Shell had
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ANALYSIS

The Piney Woods opinion appears to incorporate both approaches of
the market value royalty clause controversy. These approaches consider
the "intention of the parties" and the "plain meaning of the words." The
"intention of the parties" approach establishes that "at the well" refers to
the physical properties of the gas produced. This approach opposes the

Middleton view that "at the well" refers to gas actually sold on the leased
property.1 58 The intention of the parties approach is a better interpretation of the phrase "at the well" for several reasons. First, the use of the
term "market value at the well" in a gas royalty clause was an attempt by
draftsmen to calculate royalties on gas sold or used off the premises. 15 9

The royalties were based on the sales contract price less the lessor's share
of the transportation, processing and other costs.1 60 Therefore, the Piney
of "at the well" considers the actual intention of the
Woods meaning
161
industry.

Second, this interpretation avoids Middleton's view that "at the
well" and "off the premises" are mutually exclusive.1 62 Middleton defined "sold at the well" as sold within the lease.' 63 This interpretation
causes absurd results because practically identical leases are treated differently.' 6 Furthermore, it appears that "the commonly accepted definition in the oil and gas industry [is] that 'at the well' means in the area or
in the field." 165 While the court in Piney Woods did not adopt this liberal
interpretation of "at the well," 1 66 its interpretation will avoid the inconclaimed that this would result in a "wash," but the district court held that the lessors are still entitled
to this royalty determination. Id. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the lessors' claim
for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. Id. at 241-42.
158. 613 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1981).
159. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and
Gas Law: Issues of the Eighties, 35 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 3 (1984).

160. See Lowe, supra note 159, at 3. The lessee was "working back" from the actual amount
realized from the sale to a value before the increase. Id.
161. The court followed this approach when it deducted these costs in computing "market
value" once it had defined "market value." 726 F.2d at 240; see supra text accompanying note 156.
162. 613 S.W.2d at 243; see supra note 102 and accompanying text; Lowe, supra note 159, at 8.
163. 613 S.W.2d at 243.
164. See supra note 105. Middleton itself caused an absurd result in that the lessor on whose
property the plant was located was the only one who obtained royalties based on amount realized,
while the other lessors near him received market value royalties. See Lowe, supra note 8, at 156.
165. Lowe, supra note 159, at 9.
166. 726 F.2d at 227. The district court did interpret "at the well" this liberally by holding that
the sales contract, which provided points in the field as points of sale, (i.e., title passed in the field),
embodied the intention of the parties. 539 F. Supp. 976-77. The district court found that "the use of
'off the premises' and 'at the well' .
does not describe circumstances intended to be mutually
exclusive." Id. at 977.
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sistent results caused by Middleton.167 Hopefully, this decision will
dampen litigation concerning determination of actual sales point.
Nevertheless, this liberal interpretation was not extended throughout the opinion. In its express rejection of several commentators' views,
the court held that market value does not refer to contract price or something less than contract price.1 68 This court used the "plain meaning of
the words," or Vela approach, to define market value as current market
value. 16 9 The court stated several reasons for its conclusions. One reason is that gas sales contracts are only executory;1 70 therefore, gas is not
sold until it has been produced and delivered. 1 71 According to the court,
another reason is that gas used off the premises does not have the actual
proceeds upon which a royalty can be based. Therefore, the market
value approach must be used. The final reason is that custom cannot be
on parties unless they have actual or presumed knowledge of
binding
it. 172 The custom in the industry of using actual proceeds as the basis for
royalty was rejected.
There are problems with each step -of the court's analysis. In holding that the gas sales contract is executory and that gas is not sold until it
has been produced and delivered to the purchaser, the court overlooked
the reality of the industry. While the court's interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code in Mississippi is correct, 1 73 the court failed to
realize that, for all practical purposes, the gas is "sold" for the parties to
the lease when the sales contract is made. 174 The Uniform Commercial
Code should not have been so strictly applied to the situation between
the lessee and the lessor, although it does apply to the contract.
Another problem with the court's analysis concerns the discussion
of gas used off the premises. The court decided that market value could
not be the same as or less than actual proceeds for gas used off the premises because there are no proceeds for gas "used," as opposed to gas
167. Lowe, supra note 159, at 10 n.50a.
168. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 231; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for the rejected view.
169. 726 F.2d at 231.
170. Id. at 234.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 236.
173. The court used Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-105 (1981), which states that gas is a future good
since it is not "both existing and identified." Furthermore, contracts for the sale of gas are contracts
for the sale of goods, but until the gas is severed from the land the contract is "effective only as a
contract to sell." Id. § 75-2-107.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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"sold." 17 Admittedly, it is true that no actual proceeds exist for this
gas. However, when draftsmen base royalty on "market value at the
well" for gas "sold or used off the premises," they mean to base royalty
on that amount which the gas could have been sold for "at the well"-in
the field and less certain expenses-as of the date of the contract or contracts selling other gas. Therefore, the same formula was intended for
gas used off the premises. The court's reasoning appears to be a weak
attempt to back up an interpretation contrary to that intended by the
industry. If the industry contemplated and the parties knew that "market value" equals or is less than amount realized, then that formula
should be applied to both gas sold and gas used, as the royalty clause
states, and should be applied regardless of the fact that no "actual" proceeds exist for some of the gas.
In Piney Woods, the court rejected the custom of the industry as a
factor in determining market value. 76 The court stated that the parties
cannot be presumed to know of such a custom.77 It did not, however,
specifically determine whether
these particular parties may have been
178
aware of such a custom.
The problems with following Vela's market value approach flow basically from these courts' refusing to recognize the true intention of the
parties to the leases in question. Most of these courts have refused to
look at the actual parties or transactions but instead have looked to "theoretical" or "presumed" ones.1 79 One commentator states that
[i]t is probably not correct to say in construing the royalty clause that
the lessor and lessee in fact intended "market price" to mean what it
was construed to mean in Vela; neither would it be correct to say that
they in fact intended "market price" to mean that price which the
lessee was able to obtain in a long-term gas sales contract. . . . It is
. ..more nearly correct to say that by construing "market price" to
mean that price which the lessee is able to obtain by using his best
business judgment is a construction which is likely to be
1 0in accord with
the probable intention of the average lessor and lessee. "
The Piney Woods court stated that its holding best suits the lessors'
175. 726 F.2d at 235; see supra note 145 and accompanying text. Thus market value was not
amount realized for gas sold since a uniform application was "more natural." 726 F.2d at 235.
176. 726 F.2d at 236; see supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
177. 726 F.2d at 236.
178. Id.
179. See, e-g., Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 488, 562 P.2d 1 ("theoretical free market"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
180. Morris, supra note 64, at 78 (emphasis in original).
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legitimate contractual expectations;18 1 however, deciding that market
value is the gas sales contract price or the price less certain expenses
would not be foreclosing the lessors' legitimate expectations. If the lessors have not specifically interpreted market value as current market
value, then these expectations are merely for royalties, and they would
still be receiving such. Furthermore, this argument indicates that it
would be wise to inquire into the particular facts and circumstances to
determine what the parties actually believed.
Defining "market value" along Vela's lines necessitates preventive
measures by the industry. Some measures most frequently mentioned are
obtaining division orders, passing the costs on to the gas purchasers, and
drafting more exact language in the royalty clause."8 2 Division orders
are authorizations to the purchaser telling him how much he is to pay
and to whom he must pay it.1 8 ' However, producers have used the orders in recent years to modify the leases' royalty provisions by specifying
that the royalty is to be based on actual proceeds.18 4 The lessors appear
bound by these orders since they have signed them with the other parties.1 85 However, one court found that, because there was no consideration to support the signing, the lessor was not bound.1 8 6 Another court
held that even if the lessor was bound, he was released from the order
upon filing suit for any additional royalty.18 7 The gas division orders
18
could also be viewed as overreaching on the part of the lessee.
Passing the higher royalty payments on to the purchaser also appears ineffective. It may be difficult to persuade the purchaser to sign a
contract that contains a provision that he must make up the difference if
the lessee is forced to pay higher royalties.8 9 Even if the purchaser does
sign, then the cost will almost certainly be passed on to the consumer.
It appears that the best alternative would be specific drafting.' 90
This alternative does not solve the problem, however. Many leases with
the market value language are still in effect. In addition, forms with market value language may still be purchased.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

726 F.2d at 237.
See Lowe, supra note 8, at 156-67.
4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAs LAw § 701, at 572 (1984).
Id. § 705, at 604.
Lowe, supra note 8, at 157.
See Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 664 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 1983).
See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).
Lowe, supra note 159, at 19.
Lowe, supra note 8, at 163.
Id. at 166.
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CONCLUSION

These clauses were intended to have a meaning other than that attributed to them by the courts. Rather than being equitable, the courts'
interpretations cause more problems for the industry. Therefore, the industry must take some preventive measures. Unfortunately, many of
these preventive measures are ineffective. The court in Piney Woods
made one step in the right direction when it defined "at the well" according to the industry's intended usage. Its failure to make a uniform interpretation is puzzling. It will no doubt cause confusion in Mississippi, as
well as in those jurisdictions that have yet to decide the issue. When
these jurisdictions address the issue, then perhaps they will realize that
the best approach is to interpret according to the particular parties' actual intent. Until this approach gains universal recognition, however,
this controversy will continue to breed more litigation and cause more
problems for the industry.

Emily J. Crawford
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